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Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with
third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both,
one’s own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision
making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test
how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to a disruption of the cognitive
processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous
words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In
a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the
disturbance reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In
a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment,
disturbance increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e., of punishing those
who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest
that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within
experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual
display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted
from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games,
namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative
conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be
misleading.
Keywords: indirect reciprocity, game theory, experimental games, image score, punishment reputation, sanctions,
cognitive constraints, helping behavior
INTRODUCTION
Explaining the evolution of cooperative behaviors in humans is a
longstanding challenge for economists, social scientists, and evo-
lutionary biologists. A variety of mechanisms have been identified
that promote cooperation and that require information about the
behavior of other individuals (Brosnan et al., 2010; Bshary and
Bronstein, 2011). Information about one’s cooperative strategies
can be obtained from direct interactions (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Sigmund, 2010) or be inferred from inter-
actions among others in the population (Alexander, 1987; Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005; Earley, 2010; Sigmund, 2012). Human coop-
eration is often built on reputation that reflects previous behav-
ioral decisions and that may be based on own observations or on
gossip (Sommerfeld et al., 2007). A reputation of being generous,
for example, can build up trust and thereby increase cooperation
frequency (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind and Milinski,
2000;Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002; Yoeli et al., 2013), whereas
a non-generous reputation can lead to social exclusion (Guala,
2012; Sasaki and Uchida, 2013) and other types of punishment
(Sigmund, 2007; Raihani et al., 2012). Apart from reputation
based on generosity, there are other kinds of reputational effects
that influence cooperation in humans. A reputation based on
punishment, for example, may have played a key role in the evo-
lution of punishment that promotes cooperation within groups
(Brandt et al., 2003; Gardner andWest, 2004; Hilbe and Sigmund,
2010; dos Santos et al., 2011, 2013). Various kinds of reputation
may therefore affect partner choice (Fu et al., 2008; Sylwester
and Roberts, 2010) and may thereby create a biological market
(Barclay, 2013).
Reputation games usually require the translation of observed
behavioral decisions (or of gossip) into an image score that
then needs to be continuously updated for all potential partners
within social groups. The success of cooperation through direct
or indirect reciprocity is therefore expected to rely heavily on the
cognitive abilities of the actors (Stevens andHauser, 2004; Stevens
et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010). Working memory (Becker and
Morris, 1999) and partner recognition seem to be crucial for pro-
cessing past actions, the reputation of social partners, and for
computing the adequate response to a social dilemma (Stevens
et al., 2005, 2011; Volstorf et al., 2011; Moreira et al., 2013). Any
alteration of these capacities might influence how cooperation is
achieved or whether it is achieved at all (Horvath et al., 2012).
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For example, cooperation through direct reciprocity dropped in
zebra finches (Taenipygia guttata) when the birds’ cognitive abil-
ity was experimentally reduced (Larose and Dubois, 2011), and
humans playing a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game switched
their strategies to less memory-demanding ones (Pavlovian to
Tit-for-Tat like strategies) when their working memory was
experimentally constrained (Milinski and Wedekind, 1998).
Theory predicts that very simple reputation-based strategies
can lead to cooperation in games that are far less complex and
memory demanding than real-life situations. For example, a
score that reveals the number of times a social partner helped
or punished others in previous interactions would be sufficient
to trigger cooperation in simple repeated helping games based
on indirect reciprocity (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; dos
Santos et al., 2011). Experiments that were specifically designed
to test these models found the kind of reputation formation and
the increased cooperation that were predicted (Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000; Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002; dos Santos et al.,
2013). These experiments seemed to require comparatively little
memory because all the information that theory predicted to be
relevant was provided in simple graphical form on a screen (e.g.,
a moveable arrow that indicated a level on a scale). It is, how-
ever, still unclear whether subjects in such experimental games
use the simple rules that are predicted by theory (e.g., integrat-
ing the information provided on the display) or whether they
use different and potentially more memory-demanding strate-
gies that might lead to outcomes that are similar to those pre-
dicted from the simpler models. Indeed, the typical assumptions
about human cognition that are made in current game theory
seem unrealistic (Stevens et al., 2011). The associative nature of
human memory contrasts significantly with the type of memory
that is often implemented in game-theoretical models (Stevens
et al., 2011; Volstorf et al., 2011; Bell et al., 2013). A distinctive
feature between the simple memory strategies implemented in
most reputation-basedmodels and the potentially morememory-
demanding strategies played by humans may not be whether
cooperation is achieved, but how sensitive behavioral strategies
within a given type of social interactions are to disturbance. We
therefore tested whether reputation games are sensitive to super-
fluous verbal information (similar treatments have been shown
to affect working memory of people with or without demen-
tia, see Rouleau and Belleville, 1996; Belleville et al., 2003). We
introduced this treatment into two types of reputation games,
one where reputation can only be based on generosity and one
where reputation can only be based on punishment.We based our
analyses on experimental protocols that were successfully used
before to test predictions derived from game theory (Wedekind
and Braithwaite, 2002; dos Santos et al., 2013) and that can both
lead to reputation-based cooperation with simple behavioral rules
using the simple graphical information provided on display only
(consistent with the recent theory), or with more sophisticated
and potentially more memory-demanding strategies.
METHODS
EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
A total of 185 university students participated in 22 separate
groups. To play anonymously within groups, players were asked
to choose a plug from an impenetrable tangle of cables, connect
it to a box, and chose one of 10 isolated cubicles in juxtaposition
from where each player could see the same projector screen that
displayed the details of the game. To reveal a choice, players could
secretly push one of two buttons inside the box (Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000; Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002). The buttons
were connected via the tangle of cables and a switchboard to a
green and a red light, respectively, as inWedekind and Braithwaite
(2002). One of two procedures was used to ensure full anonymity
of each player within a group and toward the experimenters. In
study 1 (see below), players learned their own identification num-
ber by drawing one of many sheets with individual sequences of
four colors (red and/or green) from a pot, reading it in secret, and
then, after all players had drawn a sheet each, pushing their indi-
vidual color code after the operator had announced an ID number
and switched the respective connection on. Each player realized
their player ID when they saw their code sequence flashed out by
the light display. In study 2, small bulbs inside the box indicated
to a player when he/she was connected via the switchboard and
hence a choice was due.
The experimenter read the game instructions (available from
the authors on request). Each player received an initial endow-
ment that could be used in the game. No information was given
about the total number of interactions that would be played. At
the end of each game, players were paid out in a way that retained
their anonymity: the individual gains were put in envelopes
marked with the player IDs (numbers from 1 to 10) and dis-
tributed on a table in a room. Each student was sent alone into
the room to take the money from the envelope marked with his
or her player ID, put the envelop back on the table, and leave the
room so that the next student could be sent in. A guard in the back
of the room made sure that no student would touch more than
one envelope, e.g., that students could not find out which enve-
lope had already been emptied. Later, all students confirmed with
their signature that they had received the amount they expected.
HELPING GAMEWITH REPUTATION BASED ON GENEROSITY (STUDY 1)
Seventy-four students of the University of Edinburgh (UK) were
distributed among 8 groups of 9 or 10. The students played
the same game that 12 other groups of students had played in
Wedekind and Braithwaite (2002), i.e., after a practice session (a
simultaneous two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma) they played a pair-
wise indirect reciprocity game for real money (initial account of
£3.00) and with a new ID. The player in the Donor role could give
something to the Receiver (green light) or not (red light). The
cost of giving was £0.50, the benefit of receiving £1.00 (the exper-
imenter donated the difference). After this single interaction, a
new pair of players was chosen. The players were told that the
same pair would never play in the reversed role, i.e., direct reci-
procity was not possible. Generosity was recorded as the image
score that was suggested by Nowak and Sigmund (1998): giving
something increased the image score of the Donor by one unit,
not giving decreased it by one unit. This image score was graphi-
cally displayed with an arrow that wandered from an initial image
score of 0 to a minimum of −6 or a maximum of 6. Both player’s
histories of giving or not could therefore be displayed with these
arrows before each interaction. We played 24 rounds per group.
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Each player played once per round as Donor and twice per two
rounds as Receiver (e.g., once in round 1 and 2 each, or only twice
in round 2).
HELPING GAMEWITH REPUTATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT
(STUDY 2)
In this study, 111 students of the University of Lausanne
(Switzerland) were distributed over 14 groups of 6 to 9. The same
equipment and procedures as in study 1 were used to play the
same indirect reciprocity game as in study 1, with the following
changes: (i) the practice session was waived, (ii) a donation cost 1
CHF for the Receiver to gain 2 CHF (i.e., a change of currency was
necessary, but the costs and benefits were similar to the ones in
the first study), (iii) after each decision of the Donor, the Receiver
had an opportunity to punish the Donor (punishment cost 1 CHF
to the punisher and reduced the punished account by 2 CHF),
(iv) initial account was 20 CHF to avoid negative accounts, and
(v) only the Receiver’s ID and his/her punishment reputation was
displayed in order to experimentally separate punishment reputa-
tion from a scoring of generosity. This punishment reputation was
analogous to the image score in the first study, i.e., a score (indi-
cated with an arrow starting at 0, minimum = −5, maximum
= +5) that increased by one unit after the Receiver punished a
Donor who had not donated, and decreased by one unit after
Receiver had not punished a Donor who had not donated. Each
player played 16 times in each of the two roles, i.e., 16 rounds were
played in total. In this study, the control groups (see below) were
also used as the controls for another study on human discrimi-
nation between punishers and non-punishers (dos Santos et al.,
2013).
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF CONSTRAINED WORKING MEMORY
Groups were assigned either to a control treatment where they
could make decisions in a silent environment (as in Wedekind
and Braithwaite, 2002 and in dos Santos et al., 2013) or a distur-
bance treatment where the experimenters said superfluous words
before each decision was due. These phrases were variations of,
for example, “Donor number 7, please make your choice,” or
“Receiver number 2, you are now connected” (translated from
the French that was used in the 2nd study). Because players could
know that their decision was due by merely looking at the screen
or because the small bulb inside their box lit up, we considered
that the superfluous talking would act as a distractor and hence
impair working memory. The disturbance treatment was applied
to 3 of the 8 groups in study 1 and 3 of the 14 groups in study 2.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
We used generalized linear models (GLM) with binomial dis-
tribution to analyze the proportion of cooperative (or punitive)
decisions per group. Linear mixed models (LMM) were used to
analyze continuous response variables at the individual level, with
Group ID as a random factor. Generalized linear mixed mod-
els (GLMM) with binomial distribution were used to analyze
the Donor’s decisions as a function of the Receiver’s reputa-
tion (image score or punishment score, respectively), with Donor
(nested in Group) and Group ID as random factors. Both rep-
utation scores were corrected for group and time effects by
subtracting the current group mean score. The statistical analy-
ses were carried out with R 2.10.1 (R Development Core Team,
2010) with the lme4 package for linear and logistic mixed-effect
model analyses (Bates and Sarkar, 2007). P-values are directed
and indicated as Pdir for analyses that replicate analogous ones of
Wedekind and Braithwaite (2002). We use directed testing in such
cases because it reduces both, type I errors for findings that con-
tradict previous ones and type II errors for findings that confirm
previous ones, while avoiding the inflation of the alpha value that
comes with one-tailed testing (Rice and Gaines, 1994). All other
p-values are two-tailed.
ETHICAL NOTE
The experiments conformed to the relevant regulatory standards.
Participation was voluntary and not linked to any types of course
credits. Before the experiments, all participants were informed
that the study would be about an evolutionary and economic
problem, that they would play for real money in a game that
would last for about 1–2 h, that they would be provided with
a starting account, that they could keep what would be left of
their starting account plus their earnings during the game, that
they would play fully anonymously (i.e., anonymous to their
colleagues and to us), and that their anonymity would be main-
tained after the game. The students were recruited on campus
with permission from the respective schools. The monetary issues
of the experimental games were reviewed and approved by the
financial departments of the involved universities (Edinburgh and
Lausanne). The experiments that included the option of pun-
ishment were also reviewed by the Commission cantonale (VD)
d’éthique de la recherche clinique Sous-Commission III.
RESULTS
REPUTATION BASED ON GENEROSITY
We found significantly less cooperation in the disturbed groups
(i.e., in those that were exposed to the superfluous words)
than in the controls (GLM, z = −4.19, P < 0.0001; Figure 1A).
Consequently, image scores were on average higher in the con-
trol than in the disturbed groups (LMM, t = −2.76, P = 0.007;
Figure 1B). Players in control groups finished with higher payoffs
(LMM, t = −1.82, Pdir = 0.045; Figure 1C).
Treatment also affected the use of reputation. In the con-
trols, Donors used the Receivers’ score to decide whether to
donate or not (GLMM, Receivers’ score: z = 5.13, Pdir < 0.0001;
Figure 2A), as well as their own score (GLMM, Donors’ score:
z = −8.1, Pdir < 0.0001; Figure 2A). In the disturbed groups,
players still used the Receivers’ reputation (GLMM, Receivers’
score: z = 5.14, P < 0.0001; Figure 2B), but the Donors’ own
image score had significantly less effect on the Donors’ deci-
sion to donate (GLMM, z = 4.32, P < 0.0001; Figure 2B), and
was only close to significance (Donors’ score: z = −1.95, P =
0.051). Cooperative players received significantly less monetary
benefits in the disturbed than in the control groups (Table 1;
Figure 3A).
As expected, the costs of helping led to negative correlations
between image score and account during the first rounds of the
game in both treatment groups (Figure 3B). The Donors’ ten-
dency to reward high image scores compensated for the costs
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FIGURE 1 | Cooperation in the helping game without punishment
(study 1). The figure shows the mean (± SE) per treatment of (A)
cooperation frequency, (B) final image score, and (C) final account. See text
for statistics (∗p < 0.05).
of helping after some rounds in the control groups. In the dis-
turbed groups, however, the correlations between image score
and account remained negative throughout the 24 rounds, i.e., no
significant compensatory effects of reputation could be observed
(Figure 3B).
REPUTATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT
The experimental disturbance did not significantly affect coop-
erativeness in the indirect reciprocity games with punishment
(GLM, z = −1.02, P = 0.31; Figure 4A). However, disturbance
reduced the rate of punishing defection (GLM, z = −2.02, P =
0.043; Figure 4B) and increased the rate of punishing cooperative
moves (GLM, z = 4.69, P < 0.0001; Figure 4C). Consequently,
overall punishment (either punishing defection or cooperation)
did not differ between treatments (GLM, z = 1.64, P = 0.10).
There was no significant treatment effect on mean final accounts
(LMM, t = −0.59, P = 0.56).
Donors used the Receivers’ punishment score in the control
groups (GLMM, z = 2.69, P = 0.007; Figure 5), but not in the
disturbed ones (GLMM, z = −0.33, P = 0.74; Figure 5). The
reputational effects of punishment would therefore be expected to
compensate at least partly for the costs of punishment. Indeed, the
correlation between account and mean punishment score was not
significantly negative in the control groups (LMM, t = −0.68,
P = 0.49; see also dos Santos et al., 2013). However, the cor-
relation between account and mean punishment score was not
significant in the disturbed groups either (LMM, t = −1.23, P =
0.23).
DISCUSSION
We found in our first experiment that saying superfluous words
to students who play an indirect reciprocity game significantly
altered their use of reputation and reduced overall cooperation.
When undisturbed, individuals took information about their
partners’ reputation into account and showed a strong tendency
to help those who have helped others before. Their decisions were
also influenced by their own reputation, apparently with increas-
ing importance the further their own reputation deviated from
the group mean. Therefore, subjects with very low image scores
frequently donated even to low-reputation partners. Over time,
the tendency of others to reward high image scores, i.e., the long-
term benefits of generosity clearly compensated for the immediate
costs of building up an image score. Therefore, a necessary con-
dition for the evolution of reputation-based generosity was met
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). By the end of our game, the ten-
dency of others to reward high image score even resulted in a
positive correlation between image score and total income. All
these findings confirm previous observations that used the same
protocol on other groups of students (Wedekind and Braithwaite,
2002). In the disturbed conditions, however, subjects did not
seem to care as much about their own reputation as they would
in the undisturbed conditions. It happened comparatively often,
for example, that they defected with low reputation partners even
though their own score was also low. As a result, average image
score, overall cooperativeness, and final payoff were all lower in
the disturbed conditions as compared to the controls. Moreover,
the immediate costs of generosity did not get compensated during
the 24 rounds in our disturbed environment, i.e., the correlation
between image score and total income remained negative, and no
long-term benefits of generosity could be observed. Therefore,
a key condition for the evolution of reputation-based generos-
ity appeared to be not met under the disturbed and possibly
memory-constrained conditions.
Our second study controlled experimentally for any possi-
ble effects of reputation based on generosity. If reputation was
built up in the second experiment, it could only be linked to
punishment behavior. dos Santos et al. (2013) recently found
that, under such conditions, humans provide more help to those
who have a high punishment reputation than those with a low
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FIGURE 2 | Reputation use study 1. (A) In the control groups, Donors were
increasingly more likely to donate as the Receivers’ score increased. The
Donors were also increasingly likely to donate with decreasing own score,
and less likely to donate with increasing own score. (B) In disturbed groups,
Donors were still more likely to donate as the Receivers’ score increased, but
effects of Donor’s own score seemed less important as in the control
condition. The bold lines show the projection of the x and y axes. Scores are
the deviation from the group mean per interaction. See text for statistics.
Table 1 | Linear mixed-effect model fit on the individual final account
explained by mean image score in study 1.
Estimate (SE) t P
CONTROLS
Intercept 6.71 (0.64) 10.38 < 0.0001
Mean image score 0.36 (0.18) 1.95 0.054 (0.043a)
DISRUPTED
Interceptb 0.084 (0.85) 0.09 0.92
Mean image scorec −0.62 (0.27) −2.28 0.026
aPdir confirming previous findings (Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002).
bIntercept difference to control treatment.
cSlope difference to control treatment.
punishment reputation. In their experiment, the punishment
reputation turned out to be mainly built up by punishing defec-
tors. Antisocial punishment (punishment of those who helped)
was rare and declined over the course of the experiment. In
the long term, the increased willingness to donate to punish-
ers compensated for the immediate costs of punishment (dos
Santos et al., 2013). Therefore, a necessary condition for the evo-
lution of reputation-based punishment was met (dos Santos et al.,
2011). Here, we exactly followed the experimental protocol of
dos Santos et al. (2013) but disturbed the players (and proba-
bly constrained their workingmemory) by saying few superfluous
words between twomoves each. This additional treatment did not
significantly change overall punishment rates or cooperation fre-
quencies. Nevertheless, disturbance clearly affected punishment
behavior and the subjects’ discrimination between punishers and
non-punishers. There was less punishment of defectors and more
antisocial punishment in the disturbed environment than in the
undisturbed environment. The resulting punishment reputation
seemed to have lost its significance for subjects in the Donor
role: we found no more effects of the punishment reputation
on the likelihood of donations. Moreover, the immediate costs
of punishment were not compensated during the 24 rounds in
our disturbed environment, i.e., the correlation between punish-
ment score and total income remained negative. Therefore, a key
condition for the evolution of reputation-based punishment (dos
Santos et al., 2011) appeared not to be met under our disturbed
conditions.
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FIGURE 3 | Costs and benefits of generosity in study 1. (A)
Regressions between final account and mean image score, plotted
for each player in the disturbed (open symbols, hatched line) and
the control condition (closed symbols, solid line). (B) Pearson’s
correlation coefficients r between image score and account at the
end of each round, for the disturbed (open symbols, hatched line)
and the control condition (closed symbols, solid line). See Table 1
for statistics.
Theory predicts that simple strategies based on very lit-
tle information, e.g., a simple score that summarizes previous
actions, are sufficient for reputation-based cooperation to evolve
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Roberts, 2008; dos Santos et al.,
2011). When humans were put into the respective situations and
in front of a screen that provided all the information necessary
to play these simple strategies, they seemed to behave as pre-
dicted: reputation based on generosity or on punishment was
used, and the use of reputation increased cooperation frequencies
(Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2001; Wedekind
and Braithwaite, 2002; dos Santos et al., 2013). However, such
experiments cannot reveal the strategies humans use. It is still
possible that humans use more sophisticated strategies than those
predicted from the available models (e.g., Stevens et al., 2011),
and that different strategies lead to similar outcomes under given
experimental conditions. In the undisturbed conditions of our
first study, for example, subjects based their decisions not only
on their partners’ reputation but also their own, suggesting that
they managed their own reputation strategically (i.e., maintain-
ing a positive reputation and not investing unnecessarily when
the reputation is already high). Humans may also value the repu-
tational effects of donation, defection, and punishment relative
to the respective context (Barclay, 2006; Ule et al., 2009). Not
donating to a Receiver with a low reputation for generosity could,
for example, be valued differently to not donating to a Receiver
with a high reputation for generosity (Ule et al., 2009; but see
Milinski et al., 2001). The image score we provided on screen
would not be differently affected by these situations, as in the orig-
inal models that were tested. Moreover, it is possible that humans
value more recent decisions differently to earlier ones, or that
they search for behavioral patterns (e.g., analogously to the algo-
rithm suggested by Hauert and Stenull, 2002), or that they value a
given image score not against zero but against a group mean that
changes over time (as for example suggested by Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000 and Molleman et al., 2013). The information we
provided on screen would not be sufficient to play such sophisti-
cated strategies. The participants in the experiments would have
to use more memory-demanding strategies than those proposed
in the original models.
Experimentally reducing information on the others’ actions
and payoffs, or adding randomness to the link between an action
and its payoff consequences, have been shown to decrease cooper-
ation (Duffy and Feltovich, 1999; Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006).
We did not directly manipulate the amount of information that
was available, but by adding a disturbance and thereby probably
constraining the participants’ working memory, our treatment
may have had a similar effect in the sense that some of the
available information was discarded. The information that was
discarded seems not to have been fully captured by the simple
scores displayed on screen. This suggests that humans do not
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FIGURE 4 | Cooperation and punishment in the helping game with
punishment (study 2). The figure shows the mean (± SE) per treatment of
(A) cooperation, (B) punishment of defection, and (C) punishment of
helping (“antisocial punishment”; ∗p < 0.05).
play the simple strategies that were shown to be sufficient for
the evolution of reputation-based cooperation, i.e., their strate-
gies integrate more information than just their partners’ image or
punishment score (sensu Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; dos Santos
et al., 2011). Although simple reputation games can be cooper-
atively solved with simple strategies in theory, real-life situations
may have selected for cognitively more demanding strategies. This
goes in line with the assumption that reputation use might be
too cognitively demanding for most animals other than humans
(Stevens et al., 2005). Reputation use by cleaner fish is a notable
exception (Bshary and Grutter, 2006).
Antisocial punishment has frequently been observed in eco-
nomic experiments (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis,
FIGURE 5 | Effects of punishment reputation on donations in (A) the
control and (B) the disturbed condition in study 2. Donations (black
symbols) and refused donations (gray symbols) are plotted against the
Receiver’s punishment reputation (deviation from group means, rounded to
the nearest 0.1 so that the size of the symbols reflect the number of
observations). The curves are based on GLMM estimates on the Donors’
probability of giving, the dotted vertical lines indicates zero deviation from
the group mean. See text for statistics.
2008), and theoretical studies on the evolution of antisocial pun-
ishment have demonstrated that such behavior can be expected
under some conditions (Jensen, 2010; Rand et al., 2010; Rand
and Nowak, 2011; Dreber and Rand, 2012). However, the finding
that cooperation and punishment are altered after adding a slight
disturbance to the experimental procedures implies that quanti-
tative conclusions drawn from results of economic experiments
can easily be misleading, as they would be highly dependent on
how the experiments are framed and on how they are performed
(Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006). Variation in the use of repu-
tation or in punishment behavior could potentially be linked to
slight variation in experimental set-ups, including the exact word-
ing of the game instruction and possibly the appearance of the
experimenter, the time of the day, or the present context of the
participants (e.g., if they are students, what courses are they tak-
ing, which semester it is, whether they are close to an exam period
or not). Such potentially confounding effects are very difficult to
control in, for example, cross-cultural studies (e.g., Henrich et al.,
2006; Herrmann et al., 2008).
We conclude that reputation-based interactions are very sen-
sitive to disturbance. Exposure to a few superfluous words
can be sufficient to significantly change behavioral strategies
in reputation games. Subjects do not seem to use the simple
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algorithm that was found to be sufficient for the evolution
of reputation-based cooperation and punishment (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; dos Santos et al.,
2011). Quantitative differences between experimental games or
groups of participants can therefore be misleading.
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